# Spatial modeling of extraction and enforcement in developing country protected areas (Albers, 2010, Resource and Energy Economics)

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**Optimal enforcement** and Pragmatic versus dogmatic approaches to protected area management and Incorporating distance into economics models and What place for theory these days





# Today's talk

- Before Albers' 2010 paper
  - Becker and optimal enforcement
- Albers' paper
- Extensions
- Relevance to 2025





# **Gary Becker**

Bring economics into the law of enforcement






# Key aspects of Prof Albers' paper

- Model
  - Focus on role of distance as a cost
  - Distance and enforcement as substitutes
- Take home messages
  - Pragmatic approaches versus dogmatic






 Imagine a protected area with people living around the outside








- Extractors make a "distance decision"
  - How far into the forest to go to collect resources
- As such, protected area manager should incorporate spatial considerations into their enforcement decisions








- Extractors make a "distance decision"
  - How far into the forest to go to collect resources
  - What makes them turn around?
  - Some non-linearity in the model








- Recognising extractor behaviour, what might an optimal enforcement strategy look like
  - That takes explicit account of how distance influences extractors







- No point in protecting deep in the forest
  - Extractors don't go there even without enforcement
- Can concentrate patrols closer to the edge of the forest
  - Some deterrence to extractors
  - But probably not full deterrence
  - Also therefore implications for conflict








#### **Extension to model**

- If conflict is recognised as costly, can "compromise"
  - Allow some extraction in a buffer zone
  - Enforce a ring
  - Leave core where villagers will not enter
- What if multiple patches of forest
- Extractors can switch which patch they go to






#### Schematic of results



a. No Patrols


 $\phi(d) = 0$  for all d




b. Homogeneous Patrols

 $\phi(d) = \phi_A$  for all d

c. Boundary Patrols




KEY




d. Interior Ring Patrols


φ (d)=0 except at ring at d\*



e. Enforcement Zone

(optimal d within zone)





f. Enforcement Zone

(optimal d at zone boundary)

 $\phi = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ for all } d < d_e \\ \phi (d) \text{ in enforcement zone} \\ 0 \text{ for all } d > d_i \end{cases}$ 



## Implications and relevance to 2025

- What is lost if distance and space is not explicitly accounted for
- How a better understanding of spatial aspects of resource extraction and enforcement can reduce "costs of conflict"
- In the era of big data, do we still need theory?
- Zoning for carbon offsets
- Zoning for blue carbon





# Thank you!



