Written by Ismail Beyaz; PhD student with SCENARIO DTP, University of Reading, UK.
It has been almost a week since COP29 began, with no shortage of headlines, from the Argentinian withdrawal leaving the G77 to find a new leader for negotiations, to the remarks made by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev leading to a decision by the French environment minister not to attend. This absence adds to a list of other prominent figures not attending, leaving a leadership vacuum at COP29 as big players shun the event. While President Xi Jinping is also absent, which is particularly glaring as China is one of the global leaders in green energy (Hanson, 2024), China has sent the 5th biggest national delegation to COP29 with almost 1,000 individuals (Bryan, 2024) and thus potentially filling that vacuum. So how is China acting and presenting itself at COP29?
While China is its own negotiating block as part of the G77, as it is big enough to have that power and influence, it seems to our observers on the ground, such as Theo Keeping, that Chinese involvement in the negotiations is somewhat muted, giving relatively small technical feedback to clarify wording, restructuring of agreements in slight ways, and addressing vagueness in agreements. While the Chinese delegation may act differently behind closed doors, this negotiating style is markedly different to those of regions including (but not limited to) Europe, America, Africa and the Middle east, with such groups tending to advocate far more strongly for their own interests or position, arguing for or against the validity of changes, implementation of agreements, whether these are based on agreements of previous treaties, and generally more ‘big picture’ concepts.
This leaves us with the question of why. Why would China, a global power, take an arguably reserved approach to such a conference? There may be several reasons, having to do with Chinese investment into domestic green energy production, its role as an emitter, the academic work being conducted domestically, and its own foreign policy.
Domestically, China has been one of the world’s pre-eminent investors in green energy production since the early 2000s (Hilton, 2024), meaning it stands to gain from the transition from green energy. It also means that it can rely far less on multilateral action to get funding and make progress, with instead its domestic enterprises being a key driver in the development and implementation of renewable energy (Hilton, 2024), with this leading to a lower reliance on multilateral agreements. Likewise, aspects of China’s foreign policy, specifically the Belt and Road initiative, involve bilateral rather than multilateral projects, with piecemeal progress that develops domestic industry while also developing relations with countries abroad (Jones & Hameiri, 2020). These policy factors could represent a lower desire for commitments to multilateral international agreements as a general policy, especially given that China is a “non-annex 1 party […] meaning it is not obligated to contribute climate finance and was not required to make binding emissions cuts” under previous climate agreements (Liu, et al., 2023).
Also needed for consideration is the fact that China are big emitters themselves, being one of the biggest polluters (Liu, et al., 2023) by most metrics. Given China’s reliance on coal (Hilton, 2024), such a contradiction between being an investor in renewable energy but also one of the world’s biggest coal consumers and polluters can invite accusations of hypocrisy as it preaches energy transition. As it stands, if China were to be more vocal at COP29, to push international agreements in a direction more favourable to its own interests, this may harm China’s image on the global stage. However, China’s behaviour at future COPs may change, as Chinese demand for fossil fuels is predicted to peak relatively soon (IEA, 2023).
It is also worth noting that Chinese universities rank among the world’s leading institutions for renewable energy engineering (EduRank, 2024), meaning it is also potentially less reliant on foreign research or development. I see this in my research in and around the topic of wind turbines, with many papers being published in Chinese institutions (this is admittedly anecdotal). Arguably, this plays a lesser role, as the primary amount or significant research is likely conducted in secret by state-owned enterprises. It could, however, signal that research into renewable energy is being conducted on a broad scale in Chinese academic institutions.
All these factors could indicate that China believes its time is better spent developing renewable energy at home and tackling climate change through bilateral agreements rather than multilateral agreements. It should be noted that China still contributes and participates in some multilateral projects such as the “south-south cooperation fund” as well as making joint statements with other global actors (Liu, et al., 2023).
Overall, it certainly seems that, at least in the past and this previous week, China strikes a markedly different tone to the rest of the world at COP29 in relation to quite public negotiations. As the Walker Institute’s observers on the ground note, China is less vocal and overt in publicly pushing agreements and negotiations in a direction that benefits Chinese positions and aims compared to other negotiating blocs. This is likely because of China’s domestic investments and development alongside its foreign policy, which has invested heavily in renewable energy, but also turned China into one of the world’s biggest emitters. It also seems that China prefers to do business bilaterally rather than multilaterally. However, while China may be somewhat quiet at COP29, it certainly is not taking a back seat when it comes to tackling global warming, investing heavily in the implementation of renewable energy and importantly, still partaking in COPs and engaging with global stakeholders.
However, there are signs that this reserved approach may be shifting, with Chinese officials such as Wen Hua stating, “China is willing to take a more active role in global climate governance” (CarbonBrief, 2024a). Additionally, President Xi Jinping calling for the “global south to work together to practise true multilateralism”, and Chinese climate envoy Liu Zhenmin saying “international multilateral climate cooperation should continue” (CarbonBrief, 2024a).
Finally, there was also a small but indicative change from last year to this year, with a government affiliated think tank’s annual report including the phrase “international cooperation” this year, which it previously hadn’t (CarbonBrief, 2024b). As Wanyuan Song mentions, “as much as they [China] want to do it [fight global warming] inside China, they can’t do it unless the world is doing it as well” (CarbonBrief, 2024b).
How exactly this would affect future COPs is unclear, but if, maybe even when, China becomes more vocal, it will no doubt shift bargaining power and power dynamics present at COP29, with previous leaders such as the United States or Europe taking a more reserved stance as China leads.
Works Cited
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